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Is the U.S. Unique? 
International Evidence on the Aggregate Earnings-Returns Association 
Abstract 
We exploit differences in institutional and macroeconomic environments to shed light on what 
drives variation in the aggregate earnings-returns relation over time within the U.S. and across 
countries. We find that both intertemporal and cross-country variation in the aggregate earnings-
returns association are driven primarily by two factors, namely, the monetary policy news 
conveyed in aggregate earnings and the market reaction to that news, which suggest that the 
strength of the discount rate news channel plays an important role in explaining the aggregate 
earnings-returns relation both within and outside of the U.S. We further find that institutional 
characteristics have a significant effect on the information content of aggregate earnings and 
hence on the aggregate earnings-returns association—aggregate earnings are more informative 
about policy changes in countries with stronger investor protection and greater accounting 
transparency. Overall, our study provides new evidence on what drives the aggregate earnings-
returns relation across the globe. 
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1. Introduction 
In contrast to the positive association between earnings news and stock returns at the firm 
level, in a seminal paper Kothari, Lewellen, and Warner (2006) document a negative association 
between aggregate earnings news and stock returns in the U.S. over the 1970 to 2000 period. 
Numerous studies have since explored this association and its underlying determinants. While 
early evidence attributes the negative aggregate earnings-returns (E-R) relation to the 
predictability of aggregate earnings changes (Sadka and Sadka, 2009), more recent studies find 
evidence in support of a discount rate news channel whereby aggregate earnings convey discount 
rate news (Shivakumar, 2007; Cready and Gurun, 2010; Gallo, Hann, and Li, 2016). While these 
studies advance our understanding of what drives the aggregate E-R relation, they are limited to 
one (or at most a few) time series within a single economy—the U.S.  
A recent study by He and Hu (2014) examines the aggregate E-R relation in an 
international setting. They find that, in contrast to the U.S. market, this association is largely 
positive outside of the U.S. over the 1988 to 2009 period and conclude that the negative 
aggregate E-R relation documented in prior research is unique to the U.S. They further find that 
earnings predictability (as opposed to the discount rate news in aggregate earnings) explains the 
variation in the aggregate E-R relation across countries. These different findings outside of the 
U.S. are interesting, and perhaps surprising. In this study, we attempt to shed some light on these 
differences by examining 1) why the negative aggregate E-R association documented for the 
U.S. in prior studies does not extend to other countries, 2) whether the discount rate news 
channel can explain the aggregate E-R association outside of the U.S., and 3) how the aggregate 
E-R relation is affected by institutional differences across countries. 
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We address these questions using a sample of 31 countries, including the U.S., over the 
period 1988 to 2016. We begin by documenting the aggregate E-R relation for each country. 
Like He and Hu (2014), we find that the association is positive for a majority of the sample 
countries—the association is positive for 25 out of 31 countries, although it is significant for only 
9 countries. At the surface, this result appears to challenge the previously documented negative 
association for the U.S. However, we find that over the sample period considered (i.e., 1988-
2016), the aggregate E-R relation for the U.S. is also positive.1 Though seemingly different from 
Kothari et al. (2006), prior work shows that the aggregate E-R association in the U.S. has 
become less negative (or positive) in recent decades (Sadka and Sadka, 2009; Gallo et al., 2013, 
2016; Kim et al., 2017). Consistent with prior research, we find that the aggregate E-R 
association is negative and significant in earlier periods (in general, any subperiods prior to 
2000) while it is positive, though not always significant, in more recent periods. These findings 
suggest that, even within the U.S., the aggregate E-R association is not homogeneous but rather 
varies over time.  
Given these observations, before we turn to our cross-country analysis, we first examine 
what drives the intertemporal variation in the aggregate E-R association in the U.S., as 
understanding the time-series dynamics of the association in the U.S. may provide insight into 
what drives cross-country differences in the aggregate E-R relation. Building on Gallo et al. 
(2016), who find that the negative aggregate E-R association in the U.S. is driven by aggregate 
earnings conveying monetary policy news and the market reacting negatively to policy surprises, 
we predict that the aggregate E-R association should vary with the strength of the discount rate 
news channel in the form of monetary policy news. Consistent with this conjecture, we find that 
                                                 
1 Note that He and Hu (2014) do not include the U.S. in their analysis. Their inference on the U.S. being unique is 
based solely on the findings for the U.S. documented in prior research, which generally covers earlier time periods. 
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the intertemporal variation in the aggregate E-R association in the U.S. is driven largely by two 
factors: 1) the monetary policy news contained in aggregate earnings, and 2) the market’s 
reaction to the policy news. Specifically, using changes in the Federal funds rate to capture 
monetary policy news, results from a rolling-window regression analysis show that the aggregate 
E-R association is more negative in periods when aggregate earnings convey more monetary 
policy news as well as in periods when the market’s reaction to monetary policy shocks is 
stronger. We, however, do not find evidence supporting the role of aggregate earnings 
predictability in explaining the intertemporal variation in the aggregate E-R relation in the U.S. 
Given the above evidence on the monetary policy channel, we next examine whether 
macroeconomic dynamics play a role in explaining the intertemporal variation in the aggregate 
E-R relation. We argue that the Fed is more likely to take actions in periods of heightened 
economic uncertainty, which tend to coincide with periods of greater policy uncertainty and 
hence greater policy surprises. We therefore expect both factors—the amount of monetary policy 
news in aggregate earnings and the market’s reaction to this news—to vary positively with the 
degree of macroeconomic uncertainty.2 Consistent with this conjecture, we find that in periods 
with high macro uncertainty, aggregate earnings are more informative about policy changes and 
the market reacts more strongly to policy news, resulting in a more negative aggregate E-R 
association. These findings suggest that macroeconomic dynamics play an important role in 
explaining the intertemporal variation in the U.S.  
Next, we examine the roles of discount rate news and aggregate earnings predictability in 
explaining cross-country differences in the aggregate E-R relation. Consistent with the 
                                                 
2 Monetary policy is an important policy tool used by the Fed to offset fluctuations and stabilize the economy (e.g., 
Bernanke, 2008). Therefore, the Fed is more likely to take actions during periods of heightened economic 
uncertainty. At the same time, Fed actions resolve more risk and uncertainty during such periods, leading to greater 
market reactions. 
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intertemporal evidence in the U.S., cross-country variation in the aggregate E-R relation is driven 
primarily by the discount rate news channel. Specifically, we find that the informativeness of 
aggregate earnings is a key factor—the aggregate E-R association is significantly more negative 
(less positive) in countries where aggregate earnings convey more monetary policy news. Like 
the intertemporal variation, the cross-country variation in the aggregate E-R association is not 
explained by the degree of aggregate earnings predictability. These findings suggest that the 
discount rate channel, and in particular, the information content of aggregate earnings, plays an 
important role in explaining the aggregate E-R association not only in the U.S. but also across 
the globe.  
Given the above finding, we further examine whether institutional characteristics can 
help explain cross-country differences in the information content of aggregate earnings and 
hence the aggregate E-R association. Prior studies (e.g., Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki, 2003) show 
that stronger investor protection and governance reduce managers’ and insiders’ abilities to 
manipulate earnings. As a result, in countries with a higher level of investor protection and 
stronger governance, firm-level earnings are of higher quality and better reflect true economic 
performance, and hence aggregate earnings also better reflect the state of the economy. To the 
extent that central banks make policy decisions based on current and forecasted economic 
performance, higher quality aggregate earnings news should have greater explanatory power for 
monetary policy news. Using measures of investor protection from prior literature (e.g., Leuz et 
al., 2003) as well as governance indicators from the World Bank, we predict and find that 
aggregate earnings are most informative about monetary policy news in countries with better 
investor protection and stronger legal enforcement.  
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Lastly, we examine the effect of accounting transparency on the aggregate E-R relation 
across countries. He and Hu (2014) argue that aggregate earnings are more predictable in 
countries with greater transparency. In particular, they predict and find that the aggregate E-R 
relation is less positive in countries with more transparent disclosure, suggesting that the 
aggregate E-R relation outside of the U.S. is explained by earnings predictability. In contrast, we 
find that cross-country differences in the aggregate E-R association are not explained by the 
degree of aggregate earnings predictability in each country, but rather by the extent to which 
their aggregate earnings convey monetary policy news and the market’s reaction to this news. 
One possible explanation for the different findings is that transparent reporting affects not only 
the predictability, but also the informativeness and quality, of aggregate earnings. Hence, 
aggregate earnings are likely to convey more information about macro fundamentals and in turn 
policy news in countries with greater accounting transparency. Using the same transparency 
measures employed by He and Hu (2014), we find that aggregate earnings are indeed more 
informative about policy news in countries with more transparent disclosure. This finding 
suggests that, consistent with He and Hu, accounting transparency is an important determinant of 
the cross-country variation in the aggregate E-R relation. We further show, however, that the 
effect of transparency stems primarily from the discount rate (monetary policy) news channel 
rather than the predictability of aggregate earnings. 
Our study makes several contributions to the literature. First, while numerous studies 
explore the aggregate E-R association and its underlying determinants in the U.S., whether the 
findings documented in this literature extend to an international setting has received relatively 
little attention. Our study complements He and Hu (2014) by providing new out-of-sample 
international evidence on the aggregate E-R relation as well as the factors that drive the relation. 
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Importantly, our findings show that the U.S. is not unique and that institutional differences in 
factors such as investor protection and accounting transparency can help explain cross-country 
variation in the information content of aggregate earnings and hence the aggregate E-R relation. 
Second, while prior research shows that the discount rate news in aggregate earnings and 
the predictability of aggregate earnings can both explain the negative aggregate E-R relation in 
the U.S., the bulk of the evidence supports the discount rate news channel. Recent research by 
Gallo et al. (2016) shows that aggregate earnings conveying monetary policy news is a specific 
discount rate news channel. Our study extends this work by showing that the monetary policy 
news channel also plays an important role in explaining cross-country differences in the 
aggregate E-R association. In particular, we find that the aggregate E-R relation is more negative 
(or less positive) in countries where aggregate earnings are more informative about monetary 
policy news.  
Third, although the focus of the study is on explaining cross-country differences in the 
aggregate E-R association, our time-series analysis, which sheds light on the factors that drive 
intertemporal variation in the E-R relation in the U.S, is interesting in its own right. While prior 
research suggests that there is significant intertemporal variation in the aggregate E-R relation, 
the factors that drive this variation are less clear.3 We find that the intensity of the monetary 
policy channel (i.e., the extent to which aggregate earnings convey monetary policy news and the 
size of the market reaction to policy news) plays an important role in explaining the 
intertemporal variation. This finding is important because it indicates that even though the 
                                                 
3 Several studies attempt to explain the intertemporal variation in the aggregate E-R relation. For instance, Gallo et 
al. (2013, 2016) find that the aggregate E-R relation is more negative in periods with negative policy surprises, 
which tend to trigger a more significant market reaction. Zolotoy et al. (2017) find that the aggregate E-R relation 
varies based on whether the economy is in a “good” or “bad” state. Kim et al. (2017) investigate how the 
relationship between aggregate earnings and future real output affects the time-series variation in this association. 
Our study examines factors that affect the monetary policy news and aggregate earnings predictability channels. 
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discount rate news in aggregate earnings may not fully explain the aggregate E-R relation in all 
periods for all countries, this does not imply that the discount rate news channel is not present as 
it is the variation in the intensity of the discount rate news channel that drives the intertemporal 
and cross-country variation in the aggregate E-R relation. 
Lastly, a large stream of the literature explores how the information content of firm-level 
earnings varies across countries. Our study complements this work by examining how the 
information content of aggregate-level earnings varies across countries, and the implications of 
this variation for the aggregate E-R association. Specifically, we contribute to the large literature 
in economics and accounting that investigates the role of institutions for disclosure attributes by 
providing evidence on the role of investor protection and accounting transparency in shaping the 
information content of aggregate accounting earnings. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature. Section 3 
summarizes the data and sample selection. Section 4 presents our empirical research design and 
results. Section 5 concludes.  
 
2. Related Literatures 
2.1 The Aggregate Earnings-Returns Relation: U.S. Evidence  
Using the U.S. data for the period 1970-2000, Kothari et al. (2006) were the first to show 
a negative relation between aggregate earnings growth and aggregate stock returns, a surprising 
finding considering the established positive relation between earnings and returns at the firm 
level. Their finding of a positive correlation between aggregate earnings and changes in certain 
proxies for discount rate news (namely, changes in the T-bill rate and default spread) suggests a 
co-movement between earnings and discount rates at the aggregate level. However, they note 
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 8
that their proxies of discount rate news only partially explain the negative relation, leaving a 
portion of the (discount-rate) shocks unexplained in their analysis.  
Cready and Gurun (2010) offer further support for the discount rate channel using daily 
market returns data and short-window analyses for the period 1973-2006. They find that after 
controlling for various macro indicators, the arrival of positive (negative) earnings news 
produces a significantly negative (positive) market reaction consistent with this earnings news 
increasing (decreasing) the discount rate applied to future cash flows. While these papers provide 
evidence on the discount rate news in aggregate earnings, they do not identify the exact channel 
by which aggregate earnings convey discount rate news.  
Shivakumar (2007) provides the first preliminary evidence that aggregate earnings are 
positively associated with future inflation. Building on this finding, Shivakumar and Urcan 
(2017) perform an in-depth analysis of the link between aggregate earnings news and future 
inflation and find a strong positive association. Specifically, they examine two causal 
mechanisms through which aggregate earnings and future inflation are potentially linked—a 
consumption channel and an investment channel—and find evidence consistent with the 
investment demand hypothesis.  
Gallo et al. (2016), on the other hand, explores monetary policy news as a source of the 
discount rate news channel. Specifically, using Federal funds futures data to measure monetary 
policy surprises and find that aggregate earnings convey news about future monetary policy 
actions. They find that positive (negative) aggregate earnings news predicts positive (negative) 
surprise changes to the federal funds rate resulting in a negative (positive) market reaction. This 
finding provides direct evidence of the discount rate news channel driving the negative aggregate 
E-R association. 
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Sadka and Sadka (2009), on the other hand, attribute the negative aggregate E-R relation 
to the predictability of aggregate earnings changes: when investors expect higher earnings in the 
future, they require a lower risk premium and thus a lower return, which the authors interpret as 
indicative of the joint determination of cash flows and discount rates. In a sample of yearly and 
quarterly data covering the period 1965-2000, they show that aggregate earnings changes are 
significantly more predictable than individual firm earnings changes and that, because the 
aggregate dividend-price ratio predicts both earnings growth and returns (in opposite directions), 
expected earnings are negatively correlated with expected returns. Although they find that 
earnings changes do not predict returns (which would be evidence in support of the discount rate 
news channel), their explanation of the negative aggregate E-R relation is offered as 
complementary to prior work emphasizing the discount rate channel.  
While the focus of much of the existing research has been on the average association 
between aggregate earnings and returns in the time-series, evidence from recent studies indicates 
that the relationship varies intertemporally in the U.S. Specifically, in recent decades, the 
negative aggregate E-R relation documented originally by Kothari et al. (2006) has turned 
positive (i.e., Sadka and Sadka, 2009; Gallo et al., 2013; Kim et al., 2017). Several studies 
attempt to identify the underlying drivers of such intertemporal variation. For instance, Gallo et 
al. (2016) find that the aggregate E-R relation is more negative in periods with negative policy 
surprises, which tend to trigger a more significant market reaction. Zolotoy et al. (2017) find that 
the aggregate E-R relation varies based on whether the economy is in a “good” or “bad” state. 
Kim et al. (2017) investigate how the relationship between aggregate earnings and future real 
output affects the time-series variation in this association. Our study examines factors that affect 
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the intensity of the discount rate news channel in the form of monetary policy news as well as the 
aggregate earnings predictability channel. 
2.2 The Aggregate Earnings-Returns Relation: International Evidence 
Although analysis of the intertemporal variation in the aggregate E-R relation in the U.S. 
provides insight into what drives the aggregate E-R relation, such an analysis is confined to a 
single economy with a relatively homogenous legal and regulatory environment over time. An 
international setting offers a rich opportunity to exploit differences in institutional characteristics 
to further advance our understanding of the relationship between aggregate earnings and stock 
returns. There is, however, surprisingly scant international research on this topic, with the 
exception of He and Hu (2014), who investigate the aggregate E-R association internationally 
and conclude that the negative association is unique to the U.S. They find that the aggregate E-R 
association is positive for a majority of the countries included in their sample, and the association 
is less positive in countries that rank higher on measures of financial disclosure transparency. 
The authors attribute the mediating effect of disclosure transparency to the same channel as that 
advanced by Sadka and Sadka (2009), where higher ex-ante expectations of aggregate earnings 
imply lower risk premium demanded by investors. Since investors in countries with more 
transparent capital markets would be able to better forecast aggregate earnings, they would tend 
to require lower returns when they expect higher earnings, and the strength of this relation 
increases with the level of transparency. They further rule out aggregate earnings conveying 
discount rate news as a driver of the cross-country variation in the aggregate E-R relation.  
Our study revisits this international evidence by examining whether the U.S. is indeed 
unique and providing additional evidence on the role of the discount rate news channel in 
explaining cross-country differences in the aggregate E-R association. Building on recent work 
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by Gallo et al. (2016), who find that the negative aggregate E-R association is driven by 
aggregate earnings conveying discount rate news in the form of monetary policy news, we 
examine whether such a monetary policy channel is also present in an international setting. In the 
U.S., it is well established that the market reactions positively (negatively) to decreases 
(increases) in the primarily monetary policy interest rate, the federal funds rate (i.e., Bernanke 
and Kuttner, 2005). Internationally, a large number of studies analyze the impact of monetary 
policy on market returns in different countries or groups of countries and find that, as in the U.S., 
markets react negatively to changes in the policy rate to varying degrees (e.g., Wang and Mayes, 
2012; Kleimeier and Sander, 2006; Ioannidis and Kontonikas, 2008; Honda and Kuroki, 2006; 
Bredin et al., 2009; Bohl, Siklos, and Sondermann, 2008). Hence, we predict that the monetary 
policy channel should also play a role in explaining the aggregate E-R relation across country. 
 
3. Data and Sample Selection 
Our sample is determined by the availability of annual accounting and stock market 
returns data in the intersection of the Compustat, Compustat Global Vantage and CRSP 
databases. We exclude observations with missing returns, earnings or book value of equity. We 
also exclude firms with stock prices less than $1. All variables are winsorized at the top and 
bottom 1% levels. To ensure representativeness of the aggregated data, we require a minimum of 
20 firms for each year-country observation, as well as a minimum of 15 years in each country 
time series, leaving 36 countries in our sample. Next, we require the countries in our final sample 
to have an interest rate as at least one of the main instruments of monetary policy.4 We also 
exclude countries with missing institutional or transparency variables. Finally, to mitigate the 
                                                 
4 Since the monetary policy implementation in Singapore is based on managing the exchange rate of the Singapore 
dollar against a basket of currencies and not on an interest rate, we exclude Singapore from our sample. 
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potential effect of outliers, we also exclude Brazil, which was the only country in the remaining 
sample that has experienced hyper-inflation during the sample period. This leaves us a final 
sample of 31 countries.  
While data on the U.S. and Canada starts in the early 1960s, our cross-country tests use 
data starting in 1988 - the first year in Compustat Global Vantage. Individual tests on the U.S. 
and Canada use all available data. We construct the aggregate measures used in our analysis as 
the sum of all firms’ annual earnings changes measured in year t-1 to year t scaled by either the 
aggregate lagged book value of equity (ΔX_Bt) or the aggregate lagged market value of equity 
(ΔX_Pt). 5 Earnings are defined as earnings before extraordinary items. Aggregate returns (Rett) 
are value-weighted aggregate returns measured over the period April 1 of year t to March 31 of 
year t+1.6,7 
Monetary policy data is retrieved from Datastream, which identifies each country’s main 
monetary-policy interest rate. These data are supplemented with data from the International 
Financial Statistics database of the IMF and the St. Louis Fed’s FRED database.  We measure 
the main policy interest rate, MPt , as of March 31 in year t+1 and the change in the main policy 
interest rate, ΔMPt, over the same period as returns (April 1 of year t to March 31 of year t+1), 
i.e., MPt+1-MPt. 
Macroeconomic Indicators 
We use two proxies for macroeconomic uncertainty in the Unites States: 
econometrically-estimated 12-month horizon forecasts of macroeconomic uncertainty from 
                                                 
5 For brevity in our notation, we suppress the country subscript (i) for all of our country-level variables.  
6 We focus our analysis on annual earnings for several reasons. First, not all countries in our sample require interim 
financial reporting and those that do often only require financial reporting on a semi-annual basis. Second, it is 
difficult to disentangle which data comes from interim reports versus extrapolation in Compustat Global because 
quarterly reports often vary in their required disclosure. Finally, the quarterly time-series is shorter for most 
countries in our sample, limiting our ability to run country-specific regressions. 
7 In calculating ΔXt, earnings (X) are measured in year t, which are ultimately announced in year t+1. Thus, 
aggregate earnings changes and returns are contemporaneous.  
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Jurado, Ludvigson, and Ng (2015) measured as an annual average from April of year t to March 
of year t+1 (Uncert), as well as the Anxious Index – the forecasted probability of a decline in 
real GDP as reported in the Survey of Professional Forecasters measured as an annual average of 
one-quarter ahead forecasts from Q2 in year t to Q1 in year t+1 (Anx).8 In order to obtain the full 
time-series for each country, values of annual GDP growth, inflation and unemployment are 
collection from the OECD and supplemented with data from the International Financial Statistics 
database of the IMF and the St. Louis Fed’s FRED database. 
Institutional Variables 
 Following Leuz et al. (2003), we proxy for investor protection using measures of Outside 
Investor Rights and Legal Enforcement from La Porta et al. (1998) and Private Control Benefits 
from Dyck and Zingales (2004). In addition to these investor protection variables, we follow 
Leuz et al. (2003) in organizing the countries in our sample into three “clusters” based on nine 
institutional variables from La Porta et al. (1997, 1998). The first cluster contains countries with 
large stock markets, low ownership concentration, extensive outsider rights, high disclosure and 
strong legal enforcement (i.e., “outsider economies”), while the second and third clusters contain 
countries with smaller stock markets, higher ownership concentration, weaker investor 
protection, lower disclosure levels and weaker enforcement (i.e., “insider economies”). Cluster 2 
contains countries with significantly better legal enforcement than cluster 3.9  
 The La Porta et al. (1998) measures of investor protection are well-established in the 
literature. However, a weakness of these measures is that there is only one value per country—
                                                 
8  Jurado, Ludvigson, and Ng’s measure of macroeconomic uncertainty was downloaded from: 
https://www.sydneyludvigson.com/data-and-appendixes. 
9 Cluster 1 contains Great Britain, Australia, the United States, Hong Kong, Canada and Norway, cluster 2 contains 
Japan, France, Switzerland, Germany, Ireland, Sweden, South Africa, Finland, Belgium, Denmark, Austria and the 
Netherlands, and cluster 3 contains Pakistan, Thailand, Philippines, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Indonesia, Italy, and 
Korea. 
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they are not updated over time and are relatively stale.10 To account time variation in these 
institutional characteristics, we utilize the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) published 
by the World Bank.11These five variables are Political Stability, Government Effectiveness, 
Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and Control of Corruption. Each variable is measured annually 
on a scale of approximately -2.5 to 2.5 where -2.5 (2.5) indicates weak (strong) governance. We 
then calculate mean values of each variable for each country over the available time-series.  
Lastly, we follow He and Hu (2014) and employ three measures of financial 
transparency. The first measure, Factor1, is from a composite measure of financial data 
availability developed by Bushman, Piotroski and Smith (2004) and reflects financial 
transparency. The second, Discl, also developed by Bushman et al. (2004), captures disclosure 
intensity related to R&D expenditures, capital expenditures, segment and subsidiary information 
and accounting methods. 12  Our third and final measure, CIFAR, is a measure of the 
comprehensiveness of financial disclosure from the Center for Financial Analysis and Research. 
All variables used in our analyses are defined in Appendix A. 
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics for our sample. Panel A reports the number of 
years, firm-years, and unique firms for each country, as well as the time-series averages of 
market returns and aggregate earnings changes for each country. Most countries have more than 
20 years of data with no country having less than 16 years. There is significant cross-country 
variation in the magnitude of the average market returns and changes in aggregate earnings. 
Panel B reports pooled-sample summary statistics four our measures of earnings, returns and 
monetary policy. The average change in aggregate earnings is very similar when scaled by the 
                                                 
10 The La Porta (1997, 1998) measures (Outside Investor Rights and Legal Enforcement) are constructed with data 
available through the mid-1990s. Private Control Benefits, from Dyck and Zingales (2004), is measured over the 
period 1990-2000. 
11 The Worldwide Governance Indicators are available at www.govindicators.org. 
12 Country-level values of Factor1 and Discl are obtained from Appendix B of Bushman et al. (2004).  
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sum of lagged book value or market value of equity. Panel C reports descriptive statistics for our 
country-level institutional and macroeconomic measures. We observe significant variation in our 
institutional measures, consistent with our sample representing countries with differing strengths 
of governance.  
 
4. Empirical Analysis and Results 
4.1 The Aggregate Earnings-Returns Relation: International Evidence 
We start our analysis by examining the E-R relation in each country in our sample. Table 
2, Panel A reports the results of regressions of market returns on contemporaneous changes in 
aggregate earnings for each country over the period 1988-2016 where aggregate earnings 
changes are measured as ΔX_Bt or ΔX_Pt. The results are consistent with He and Hu (2014) and 
point to a positive association between aggregate earnings and returns in most countries. Because 
the results using ΔX_Bt and ΔX_Pt are qualitatively similar, for brevity we limit our discussion to 
the results using ΔX_Bt. Overall, 25 countries exhibit a positive coefficient on ΔX_Bt, although it 
is only significant for nine countries, including the U.S.13 While there are six countries with a 
negative coefficient on ΔX_Bt, it is not statistically significant.14 Thus, while we do not document 
a significant negative association for the 30 foreign countries in our sample, it is perhaps not 
surprising given that we also do not document a negative aggregate E-R relation for the U.S. 
over this period. 
We then proceed with a pooled regression analysis with all countries in our sample, 
including the U.S. The results are reported in Table 2, Panel B. We again find results 
                                                 
13 The countries with a positive and significant coefficient on ΔX_Bt are Belgium, Greece, Israel, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Philippines, Portugal, Spain and the United States. The countries with a positive and significant coefficient 
on ΔX_Pt are Belgium, Israel, the Netherlands, Norway, Philippines, Spain, Sweden and the United States. 
14 The countries with a negative (insignificant) coefficient of ΔX_Bt are Finland, Germany, India, Japan, Pakistan 
and Turkey.  
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qualitatively similar to those in He and Hu (2014): the average cross-country aggregate E-R 
association is positive; the coefficient on ΔX_Bt is 2.10 and significant at the 1% level. In 
Columns 2 and 4, we include an indicator variable for the U.S. (USA) and an interaction term 
between the indicator variable and aggregate earnings changes (USA*ΔXt) to assess how the 
coefficient on aggregate earnings for the U.S. compares to that of all other countries. We find 
that the coefficients on both the U.S. dummy and the interaction term are insignificant, 
suggesting that over the last two decades, the relation between aggregate earnings and returns in 
the U.S. is, on average, not significantly different from other countries; the coefficient on ΔX_Bt 
remains positive and significant at the 1% level with a value of 2.08. Results using ΔX_Pt are 
qualitatively similar. Thus, unlike the conclusion made in He and Hu (2014), we do not find 
evidence that the U.S. is unique. Instead, our results point to time-series variation in the 
aggregate E-R association in the U.S. 
4.2 Time-series Analysis of the Aggregate Earnings-Returns Relation: The U.S. and 
Canada 
 
4.2.1 Intertemporal Variation in the U.S.: 1962-2016 
The positive association in our sample period is consistent with prior studies that have 
noted that the aggregate E-R association has become either insignificantly negative or more 
positive in the recent decades (Sadka and Sadka, 2009; Gallo et al., 2016; Kim et al., 2017). To 
further explore this time series variation, in Table 3, Panel A we estimate regressions of value-
weighted market returns on contemporaneous changes in aggregate earnings for several sub-
periods. Indeed, in the earliest period—from the first year with available data (1962) to the last 
year before the start of the global coverage (1987)—the coefficient on aggregate earnings is the 
most negative (-6.47 and significant at the 1% level). As we move forward in time, the relation 
becomes less negative over the Kothari et al. (2006) sample, 1970-2000, with a coefficient of -
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3.71. On the other hand, the sample period of He and Hu (2014), 1988-2009, is characterized by 
a significantly positive relationship (with a coefficient of 3.45, significant at the 5% level), as is 
the period for which Compustat Global coverage is available, 1988-2016 (with a coefficient of 
3.20, significant at the 5% level), which is the sample period for the cross-country analyses in 
this paper. When we look at the full sample, 1962-2016, the relation is positive but insignificant. 
These results are consistent with the observed changes from a negative to positive relationship 
over the past five decades.  
A natural question that arises from these findings is: why has this association changed 
over the last five decades? Although the focus of this study is on exploring cross-country 
differences in the aggregate E-R association, given the established similarity between the U.S. 
and other countries over the sample period, understanding the time-series dynamics in the E-R 
relation in the U.S. can not only shed light on the documented change over the time series, but 
also provide evidence on the country-level characteristics and institutional features that could 
help explain cross-country variation in the aggregate E-R relation.  
To this end, we perform a rolling window regression analysis over the full sample period 
(1962-2016). The first annual rolling regression spans 1962 to 1976, with subsequent regressions 
adding one observation at a time and dropping the first observation from the previous window 
such that the time series remains fixed at 15 annual observations. This process yields a total of 41 
time-series regressions. For each rolling window, we estimate the aggregate E-R relation (β) by 
regressing market returns on ΔX_Bt. For each window we also regress 1) changes in the 
monetary-policy interest rate on aggregate earnings to estimate the aggregate earnings news beta 
(β∆MP_∆X); 2) market returns on changes in the monetary-policy rate to estimate the market 
reaction beta (β∆MP); and 3) lagged market returns on aggregate earnings changes, using the  
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resulting R2 to the proxy for the predictability of aggregate earnings (Predictability) following 
Sadka and Sadka (2009).15 We then regress β on β∆MP_∆X, β∆MP, and Predictability both 
individually and together.  
Our results, presented in Table 3, Panel B, confirm prior findings (i.e., Gallo et al., 2016) 
that monetary policy news is an important channel that can help explain the aggregate E-R 
association. Specifically, the coefficient on β∆MP_∆X is negative and significant (-0.08) which 
points to a negative relation between the E-R association and the monetary policy news content 
in aggregate earnings—the more policy news in aggregate earnings, the more negative the E-R 
association. The positive, significant coefficient on β∆MP (95.30) indicates that the E-R 
association is positively related to the market reaction to monetary policy changes—the market 
reacts negatively (positively) to surprise increases (decreases) in the policy interest rate and 
when these reactions are more pronounced, the E-R association is more negative. However, the 
coefficient on Predictability is not significant, suggesting that the predictability of aggregate 
earnings is not the main driver of the intertemporal variation in aggregate E-R relation. When 
β∆MP_∆X, β∆MP, and Predictability are included together as explanatory variables, the 
coefficients are significantly negative, significantly positive, and significantly positive, 
respectively. The positive coefficient on Predictability is inconsistent with the negative 
association being driven by aggregate earnings predictability (which would necessitate a 
negative coefficient).  
Next, we utilize rolling regression analysis to explore whether macroeconomic 
uncertainty can help explain the time series variation in the aggregate E-R association. Because 
an important role of the Fed is to stabilize the economy, the Fed is more likely to take actions in 
                                                 
15 We perform the Durbin-Watson test to evaluate whether there is sufficient autocorrelation to warrant the use of 
Newey-West standard errors. Accordingly, our rolling regression analysis employs Newey-West adjusted standard 
errors with three lags. 
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periods of heightened economic uncertainty. Periods characterized by economic uncertainty 
often coincide with policy uncertainty. We therefore expect both factors—the amount of 
monetary policy news in aggregate earnings and the market’s reaction to this news—to vary 
positively with the degree of macroeconomic uncertainty. We use two proxies for 
macroeconomic uncertainty in the Unites States: econometrically estimated forecasts of twelve-
month macroeconomic uncertainty (Uncert) from Jurado, Ludvigson, and Hg (2015) and the 
Anxious Index (Anx) from the Philadelphia Fed’s Survey of Professional Forecasters, which 
forecasts the probability of a decline in real GDP over the following quarter.  
The results of this analysis are reported in Table 3, Panel C. We find that the aggregate E-
R association is more negative during periods characterized by greater uncertainty. Regressing β 
on our measures of uncertainty yields a coefficient of -82.81 (-0.80) on Uncert (Anx) that is 
significant at the 1% level.  Looking at the underlying drivers of the aggregate E-R relation 
reveals that not only does aggregate earnings contain more monetary policy news during periods 
of greater uncertainty, but also that the market reacts more negatively in these periods. 
Specifically, when regressing β∆MP_∆X on our uncertainty measures, the coefficient on Uncert 
(Anx) is 9.40 (0.09) and significant at the 1% level. Using β∆MP as the dependent variable, the 
coefficient on Uncert (Anx) is -63.67 (-0.69) and significant at the 1% level. Taken together, our 
rolling regression findings are consistent with the implications of Gallo et al. (2016) and offer 
new evidence on the drivers of intertemporal variation in the aggregate E-R association. 
Importantly, these findings suggest that characteristics that affect a country’s monetary policy, 
such as macroeconomic uncertainty, could play a role in explaining cross-country differences in 
the aggregate E-R association.  
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4.2.2 Intertemporal Changes in Canada: 1964-2016 
To provide out-of-sample evidence on these findings, we repeat the time-series analysis 
using data on Canada, which is the only other country in our sample with a sufficiently long 
time-series for performing similar rolling regressions. The results, reported in Table 4, are 
qualitatively similar to those for the U.S. The aggregate E-R association turns from significantly 
negative in the earlier period to positive and insignificant in recent years (Panel A). Likewise, we 
find that monetary policy news is an important channel for the aggregate E-R association in 
Canada (Panel B). Specifically, like the US, we regress β on β∆MP_∆X and β∆MP and find a 
negative (positive) and significant coefficient on β∆MP_∆X (β∆MP). Again, in Column (4), the 
coefficient on Predictability is insignificant, suggesting that after controlling for the effects of 
discount rate news, the predictability of aggregate earnings is not the channel dominating the 
aggregate E-R relation in Canada. 
4.3 Cross-country Variation in the Aggregate Earnings-Returns Relation 
A major limitation of the pooled regression analysis in Table 2 is it assumes that the 
aggregate E-R association is constant across countries, which is unlikely given the degree of 
cross-country heterogeneity. To overcome this limitation and explore what factors help explain 
the cross-country variation in the aggregate E-R association, we use the results in our rolling 
analyses of the U.S. and Canadian data to motivate our analysis in a cross-country setting.  
We use changes in each country’s primary monetary policy rate—the interest rate utilized 
by each country’s central bank that is analogous to the Federal funds rate in the U.S.—to proxy 
for monetary policy news and perform a cross-country analysis that is analogous to the rolling-
window regression analysis. Specifically, we perform three time-series regressions for each 
country to capture the strength of the three factors – the policy news in aggregate earnings, the 
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market’s reaction to the news and earnings predictability. With respect to the first factor, we 
regress changes in the interest rate on aggregate earnings and use the country-specific coefficient 
from this regression—the aggregate earnings news beta—to capture the amount of policy news 
in aggregate earnings (β∆MP_∆X). With respect to the second factor, we regress aggregate 
returns on monetary policy news and use the country-specific coefficient from this regression—
the market reaction beta—to capture the market’s reaction to policy news (β∆MP). In addition, 
we also perform time-series regressions for each country to obtain aggregate earnings 
predictability. Following Sadka and Sadka (2009), we regress lagged market return on aggregate 
earnings changes and use the country-specific R2 from this regression as our measure of 
predictability (Predictability). We then regress the country-specific aggregate E-R association (β) 
on the aggregate earnings news beta, market reaction beta, and aggregate earnings predictability 
individually and together. 
 The results, reported in Table 5, confirm our previous findings regarding the importance 
of the informativeness of aggregate earnings. Specifically, in Columns (1) and (4), the coefficient 
on β∆MP_∆X (-0.04 and -0.06) is negative and significant at the 5% level, suggesting that the 
more positive the association between aggregate earnings and policy news, the more negative the 
aggregate E-R association. The coefficient on the market reaction beta, β∆MP, is also significant 
in the predicted direction in Column (4)—the coefficient on β∆MP is 17.63, suggesting that 
when the market reaction to policy news is more pronounced, the E-R association is more 
negative. We, however, do not find evidence to support the predictability of aggregate earnings 
as a driver of the E-R relation—the coefficient on Predictability is insignificant in both the 
bivariate (Column 3) and multivariate (Column 4) models. It is also worth noting that although 
both the aggregate earnings news beta (β∆MP_∆X) and market reaction beta (β∆MP) are 
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significantly associated with the aggregate E-R relation in multivariate regression (Column 4), 
their explanatory power is significantly different in the bivariate regressions (Columns 1 and 
2)—the adjusted R2 are 14% and 1% for the β∆MP_∆X and β∆MP regression, respectively. 
These results suggest that while both factors play a role in explaining the cross-country variation 
in the E-R relation, the information content of aggregate earnings, specifically, the extent to 
which aggregate earnings convey monetary policy news, is the dominant driver in the 
international setting.  
 Overall, we find that the aggregate E-R relation is less positive in countries where 
aggregate earnings are more informative about monetary policy news. This suggests that 
monetary policy news plays an important role in explaining the relation between aggregate 
earnings and stock returns not only in the U.S., but also in other countries. In the following 
section, we investigate potential drivers of cross-country variation in the monetary-policy 
information content of aggregate earnings. 
4.4 Cross-country Variation in the Aggregate Earnings-Returns Association: Institutional 
Factors 
 
Institutional factors that affect the properties of accounting numbers can potentially 
influence the information content of aggregate earnings (e.g., Ball, Kothari, and Robin, 2000; 
Leuz et al., 2003). Ball et al. (2000) find that institutional differences across countries result in 
variations in the demand for accounting information, ultimately affecting timeliness and 
conservatism. Leuz et al. (2003) find significant variation in earnings management across a 
sample of 31 countries. Specifically, Leuz et al. (2003) link several institutional features directly 
to earnings quality. If there are systematic differences in earnings management, and hence 
earnings quality, across countries, then there should be variation in how well earnings capture the 
underlying economics of the firms.  
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Given its negative association with aggregate earnings management, investor protection 
should be positively associated with the aggregate earnings news beta as strong legal protections 
for outside investors decrease the ability of managers to exercise private control benefits and 
manipulate earnings (Leuz et al., 2003). If managers are less able to manipulate earnings, then 
aggregate earnings should better reflect macroeconomic conditions and thus will be more highly 
correlated with monetary policy changes. Each country’s central bank uses the current and 
forecasted economic climate to make policy decisions, and therefore, aggregate earnings can be a 
useful indicator in policy-setting, to the extent that earnings accurately reflect the economics of 
the firms. We therefore predict that aggregate earnings are more informative about monetary 
policy news, and hence, are more negatively associated with returns, in countries with greater 
investor protection and stronger governance. As noted earlier, the results in Table 5 suggest that 
the aggregate earnings news beta—the extent to which aggregate earnings convey monetary 
policy news—is the primary driver of cross-country variation in the aggregate E-R relation. We 
therefore focus primarily on institutional features that are likely to explain the informativeness of 
aggregate earnings in this section.16  For completeness we also report results on the market 
reaction beta.   
We test these predictions using several measures of country-level institutional 
characteristics. We first follow Leuz et al. (2003) and segment our sample into three clusters. 
The first cluster contains countries with large stock markets, low ownership concentration, 
extensive outsider rights, high disclosure and strong legal enforcement (i.e., “outsider 
economies”), while the second and third clusters contain countries with smaller stock markets, 
higher ownership concentration, weaker investor protection, lower disclosure levels and weaker 
                                                 
16 Unlike the information content of aggregate earnings, the effect of institutional characteristics on the market’s 
reaction to policy news is less clear ex ante. For instance, institutional factors may only affect the information 
content of earnings and not directly the market’s reaction to the news.  
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enforcement (i.e., “insider economies”). Then, we calculate the mean values of β∆MP_∆X and 
β∆MP using the 26 of our 31 countries able to be sorted into clusters. Results are reported in 
Table 6, Panel A. We find that consistent with predictions, β∆MP_∆X is more positive for cluster 
one (23.73) than clusters two and three (5.104 and -1.91, respectively), suggesting that in 
“outsider” economies with more developed capital markets and better legal protections, 
aggregate earnings contain more policy news. The difference between β∆MP_∆X in clusters 1 
and 3 is significant at the 5% level. Countries in cluster one do not have a significantly more 
negative market response to policy news, on average.  
One potential issue with using the main monetary policy rate in our cross-country 
analysis is that Eurozone countries are governed by a single central bank.17 Thus, it is not clear 
ex-ante whether aggregate earnings news in each individual Eurozone country will contain 
policy news. To address this concern, we estimate alternate versions of β∆MP_∆X and β∆MP, 
which we denote β∆Rate_∆X and β∆Rate, respectively. For these measures, we substitute the 
ten-year government bond rate for the main policy rate when estimating the values for Eurozone 
countries. In Panel A, we find similar results using these alternative beta measures. Specifically, 
the mean value of β∆Rate_∆X is more positive in cluster one than in clusters two and three; the 
difference between clusters 1 and 3 is significant at the 5% level.18  
Leuz et al. (2003) find that stronger investor protection and legal systems are associated 
with higher-quality earnings. Following Leuz et al. (2003), we next perform a regression analysis 
analyzing the relationship between β∆MP_∆X and β∆MP and three institutional factors that 
capture investor protection: 1) Outside Investor Rights, measured as the anti-director rights index 
                                                 
17 Eurozone countries are E.U. countries that have adopted the Euro. Eurozone countries in our sample include 
Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. 
18 The values remain unchanged in Cluster 1 using the alternative interest rate because Cluster 1 does not contain 
any Eurozone countries. 
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from La Porta et al. (1998), 2) Legal Enforcement, measured as the average of the efficiency of 
the judicial system and an assessment of rule of law (La Porta et al., 1998), and 3) Private 
Control Benefits, measured as the average block premium based on transfers of controlling 
blocks of shares (Dyck and Zingales, 2004). To control for differences in macroeconomic 
conditions, we include country-level mean values of inflation, real GDP growth, and 
unemployment.19   
Table 6, Panel B reports results from these regressions estimated cross-sectionally over 
the 26 countries with available data. Consistent with our predictions, we find positive and 
significant relationships between Legal Enforcement and Outside Investor Rights and β∆MP_∆X 
with coefficients of 4.88 and 5.91, respectively. Although the coefficient on Private Control 
Benefits is insignificant, it is likely that Legal Enforcement and Outside Investor Rights explain 
Private Control Benefits making it difficult to document a direct effect. Mean level of inflation is 
positively associated with β∆MP_∆X which suggests that the economic environment does play a 
role. Because inflation targeting is a common goal of monetary policy, it is perhaps not 
surprising that inflation is the only macroeconomic indicator that is significantly related to the 
information content of aggregate earnings. We document similar results using the alternative 
interest rate for Eurozone countries to calculate the news content of aggregate earnings 
(β∆Rate_∆X). The relationship between β∆MP or β∆Rate and these institutional measures is 
largely insignificant. Taken together, the evidence is consistent with investor protection leading 
to higher-quality earnings that contain more news about the economy, specifically monetary 
policy news. 
                                                 
19 Our time-series analysis for the U.S. highlighted the role of uncertainty in explaining variations in the aggregate 
earnings news beta and the market reaction beta. Because parsimonious measures of economic uncertainty do not 
exist for each country in our sample over the necessary time-period, we instead control for the macroeconomic 
environment using mean values of inflation, GDP growth and unemployment. 
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A limitation of the measures used in Panel B is that they are relatively stale compared to 
our sample period. In order to take into consideration variation across time in the strength of 
each country’s institutions and governance, our final set of institutional proxies make use of the 
Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) published by the World Bank and updated annually, 
which reflect each country’s political, regulatory, bureaucratic, and legal institutions. An 
additional benefit of these measures is the expanded availability for all 31 countries in our 
sample. Specifically, we employ five of the World Bank WGI indicators: Political Stability, 
Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and Control of Corruption.20 In 
addition to including each of these measures individually, we create two aggregate measures, 
WBInst_5 and WBInst_3, where the former is the average of all five measures, and the latter is 
the average of Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and Control of Corruption, which are the 
measures more closely aligned with the notion of investor protection. We regress β∆MP_∆X and 
β∆MP on each individual and aggregate measure and each specification also includes the three 
macroeconomic indicators. Table 6, Panel C (D) reports the results of these regressions using 
β∆MP_∆X and β∆MP (β∆Rate_∆X and β∆Rate).  
Political Stability, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and 
Control of Corruption are each positively and significantly associated with β∆MP_∆X, as are 
both aggregate measures. We do not document a significant association between these 
governance measures and β∆MP. The results are similar when utilizing our alternative interest 
rate measures for the Eurozone in Panel D. Political Stability, Government Effectiveness, 
                                                 
20 See Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2004) for a detailed description of these measures. 
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Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and Control of Corruption, as well as both aggregate measures, 
are positively and significantly associated with β∆Rate_∆X.21  
Taken together, the results from Table 6 document an interesting relationship between 
country-level institutions and the news content of aggregate earnings. Specifically, aggregate 
earnings contain more policy rate news in countries with stronger investor protection, consistent 
with these countries reporting higher-quality earnings that better reflect the underlying 
economics of the firms.  
4.5 Cross-country Variation in the Aggregate Earnings-Returns Association: Accounting 
Transparency 
 
 As noted previously, He and Hu (2014) find that the aggregate E-R relation is less 
positive in countries with greater financial disclosure transparency. They argue that aggregate 
earnings are more predictable in countries with greater transparency, thus attributing the 
aggregate E-R association outside of the U.S.  to be driven by earnings predictability rather than 
the discount rate news in aggregate earnings. This finding is inconsistent with our earlier 
findings—we document that the aggregate E-R does, in fact, vary across countries with the 
extent to which aggregate earnings convey discount rate news and the market’s reaction to this 
news. One potential explanation for He and Hu’s (2014) findings is that accounting transparency 
affects not only the predictability of aggregate earnings, but also the informativeness and quality 
of those earnings. Specifically, aggregate earnings may convey more information about 
macroeconomic fundamentals – and by extension, monetary policy – in countries with more 
transparent accounting information.  
                                                 
21 Although the focus of these tests is on the role of institutional factors in explaining cross-country differences in 
the information content of aggregate earnings, these results suggest that these factors should also explain cross-
country variation in the aggregate E-R relation. In untabulated analyses we find that each of the governance 
indicators (as well as the two aggregates) are significantly negatively related to the aggregate E-R relation, 
consistent with stronger institutions leading to less positive/more negative associations. 
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 To test this conjecture, we investigate whether the disclosure transparency measures 
employed by He and Hu (2014) are positively associated with β∆MP_∆X or Predictability. 
Specifically, He and Hu (2014) employ three transparency measures: Discl, a measure of 
disclosure intensity from Bushman et al. (2004), Factor1, a summary disclosure measure from 
Bushman et al. (2004), and Cifar, a measure of disclosure comprehensiveness from the Center 
for Financial Analysis and Research.  Table 7 reports results of this analysis. Consistent with our 
prediction, we find a positive and significant association between β∆MP_∆X and both Factor1 
and Discl.22 The coefficient on Factor1 (Discl) is 10.76 (0.46) and is significant at the 5% level. 
In contrast, none of the disclosure measures are positively associated with Predictability. Again, 
for completeness, we include results for the market reaction beta. Similar to the results in Table 
6, we do not find a significant association with transparency. These results suggest that aggregate 
earnings are indeed more informative about monetary policy news in countries with greater 
reporting transparency. Thus, the negative relationship between transparency and the aggregate 
E-R relation documented by He and Hu (2014) stems primarily from the discount rate (monetary 
policy) news channel, rather than the predictability of aggregate earnings.  
4.6 Robustness Tests 
We perform several additional analyses (untabulated) to test the robustness of our results. 
First, we repeat our analysis using aggregate earnings changes scaled by the lagged market value 
of equity instead of book value and find qualitatively similar results. 23  Second, using an 
alternative annual window for returns and changes in monetary policy rates—from May in year t 
to April in year t+1 instead of from April in year t to March in year t+1—yields similar results. 
Third, we repeat our rolling regression analysis using a rolling window of 12 instead of 15 years 
                                                 
22 We find qualitatively similar results when we use the 10-year government bond rate instead of the main monetary 
policy rate for Eurozone countries in estimating the aggregate earnings news and market reaction betas. 
23 We focus our analysis using the measure scaled by book value because it yields a larger sample size.  
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and find qualitatively similar results. Fourth, because the majority of firms in six of the countries 
in our sample—Australia, New Zealand, Pakistan, South Africa, India, and Japan—have fiscal 
years ending in June or September instead of December, we repeat our analyses adjusting the 
windows for returns and changes in monetary policy according to these fiscal year timeframes 
and find similar results. Finally, while we currently provide additional analysis using an 
alternative interest rate for Eurozone countries in our cross-country tests, we perform additional 
robustness tests replacing the central bank policy rate with the 10-year government bond yield 
for all countries and find qualitatively similar results.  
 
5. Conclusion 
Prior research explores the aggregate earnings-returns relation and the factors underlying 
this relation in the U.S. Despite the call for more international evidence (Shivakumar, 2010), we 
know relatively little about this phenomenon internationally, with the exception of He and Hu 
(2014), who find that the negative aggregate E-R relation is unique to the U.S. In this study, we 
shed further light on the aggregate E-R association by first examining the factors that drive 
intertemporal variation in the U.S. and then exploiting differences in institutional characteristics 
across countries to better understand this relation across the globe.   
Consistent with He and Hu (2014), we find that the aggregate E-R association is positive 
for most countries outside of the U.S. over our sample period (i.e., 1988-2016). However, the 
aggregate E-R relation for the U.S. is also positive during this period. In fact, as noted in prior 
research, although the aggregate E-R association in the U.S. is negative in earlier periods (pre-
2000), it has become more positive in recent periods (post-2000). These findings suggest that the 
difference between the U.S. and other countries proposed by He and Hu (2014) is explained 
primarily by time-series variation in the aggregate E-R relation. We further show that the 
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strength of the discount rate news channel helps explain the intertemporal variation in the U.S.—
the aggregate E-R relation is more negative in periods when aggregate earnings convey more 
monetary policy news as well as in periods when the market’s reaction to such policy news is 
stronger, which tend to coincide with periods of high macroeconomic uncertainty. 
While there is substantial intertemporal variation in macroeconomic dynamics in the 
U.S., its legal and regulatory environment is relatively homogeneous over time. A cross-country 
setting thus offers a rich opportunity to exploit differences in institutional characteristics to better 
understand the relation between aggregate earnings and stock returns. In our cross-country 
analysis, we first show that, similar to the U.S., the aggregate E-R association is driven primarily 
the monetary policy news contained in aggregate earnings—the association is significantly more 
negative (less positive) in countries where aggregate earnings contain more policy news. These 
results suggest that the discount rate news channel plays an important role in explaining cross-
country differences in the E-R relation. Also, in contrast to He and Hu (2014), we find that the 
predictability of aggregate earnings is not a key driver of the cross-country variation in the 
aggregate E-R association. Finally, we show that aggregate earnings convey more news about 
monetary policy changes, and hence are more negatively related to stock returns, in countries 
with stronger investor protection and greater transparency. 
Overall, this study provides novel evidence on the aggregate E-R association in the U.S., 
establishes a link between the U.S. and international literature on the E-R relation by showing 
that the U.S. is not unique, and sheds new light on how institutional factors affect the relation 
between aggregate earnings and market returns across the globe. 
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Appendix A. Variable Definitions 
 
Variable Definition 
ΔX_Pt The sum of annual earnings changes for all firms in 
each country measured from year t-1 to t (i.e., X_Pt - 
X_Pt-1), scaled by aggregate lagged market value of 
equity, with earnings defined as earnings before 
extraordinary items.
ΔX_Bt The sum of annual earnings changes for all firms in 
each country, measured from year t-1 to t (i.e., X_Bt - 
X_Bt-1), scaled by aggregate lagged book value of 
equity, with earnings defined as earnings before 
extraordinary items.
Rett Value-weighted aggregate returns measured from April 
1 of year t to March 31 of year t+1.  
MPt The main monetary policy rate as of the end of March of 
year t+1. 
ΔMPt Changes in monetary policy (MPt+1 – MP t) measured 
over the window from April of year t to March of year 
t+1.
USA An indicator variable equal to 1 for the United States 
and 0 otherwise.  
 
U.S. Intertemporal and Cross-country Analyses 
β The aggregate earnings-returns association for each 
country or rolling window: the estimated coefficient on 
ΔX_B from regressing Ret on ΔX_B  
β∆MP The market reaction beta for each country or rolling 
window: the estimated coefficient on ∆MP from 
regressing Ret on ∆MP. 
β∆MP_∆X The aggregate earnings news beta for each country or 
rolling window: the estimated coefficient on ΔX_B from 
regressing ∆MP on ΔX_B. 
β∆Rate Same as β∆MP, except using the 10-year government 
bond rate (Rate) instead of the main monetary policy 
rate (MP) for Eurozone countries.
β∆Rate_∆X Same as β∆MP_∆X, except using the 10-year 
government bond rate (Rate) instead of the main 
monetary policy rate (MP) for Eurozone countries.
Predictability The R2 estimated from a regression of lagged market 
return (Ret) on aggregate earnings changes (ΔX_B). 
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Variable Definition 
 
U.S. Intertemporal Analysis: Macroeconomic Uncertainty Indices 
Uncert Annual average from April in year t to March in year 
t+1 of monthly observations of 12-month ahead 
forecasts of macroeconomic uncertainty as used in 
Jurado, Ludvigson, and Ng (2015). 
Anx 
 
Annual average from Q2 in year t to Q1 in year t+1 of 
quarterly observations of one-quarter ahead forecasts of 
the probability of a decline in real GDP as reported in 
the Survey of Professional Forecasters, referred to as the 
anxious index.  
 
Cross-country Analysis: Institutional Indices and Macroeconomic Environment 
Outside Investor Rights Outside Investor Rights are measured as by the anti-
director index in La Porta et al. (1998) which ranges 
from zero to five.
Legal Enforcement Average score across three legal variables used in La 
Porta et al. (1998): 1) efficacy of legal system 2) 
assessment of rule of law and 3) the corruption index. 
Each component ranges from zero to ten. 
Private Control Benefits The average block premium based on transfers of 
controlling blocks of shares from Dyck and Zingales 
(2004).
Political Stability The likelihood that the government will be destabilized 
by unconstitutional or violent means, including 
terrorism, from the World Bank. Measured annually on 
a scale of -2.5 to 2.5 and averaged over all available 
years for each country.
Regulatory Quality The ability of the government to provide sound policies 
and regulations that enable and promote private sector 
development, from the World Bank. Measured annually 
on a scale of -2.5 to 2.5 and averaged over all available 
years for each country.
Government Effectiveness The quality of public services, the capacity of the civil 
services and its independence from political pressures 
and the quality of policy formulation, from the World 
Bank. Measured annually on a scale of -2.5 to 2.5 and 
averaged over all available years for each country.
Control of Corruption 
 
The extent to which public power is exercised for 
private gain, including both petty and grand forms of 
corruption, as well as “capture” of the state by elites and 
private interests, from the World Bank. Measured 
annually on a scale of -2.5 to 2.5 and averaged over all 
available years for each country.
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Variable Definition 
Rule of Law 
 
The extent to which agents have confidence in and abide 
by the rules of society, including the quality of contract 
enforcement and property rights, the police, and the 
courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence, 
from the World Bank. Measured annually on a scale of -
2.5 to 2.5 and averaged over all available years for each 
country.
WBInst_5 The average of Political Stability, Regulatory Quality, 
Government Effectiveness, Control of Corruption, and 
Rule of Law.
WBInst_3 The average of Government Effectiveness, Control of 
Corruption, and Rule of Law. 
Factor1 A summary measure of financial transparency obtained 
from Bushman et al. (2004).  
Discl A measure of disclosure intensity regarding some 
proprietary information including R&D, capital 
expenditure, and segment data from Bushman et al. 
(2004).
Cifar A measure of comprehensiveness of financial 
information disclosure, developed by the Center for 
Financial Analysis and Research.
Minf Average annual inflation over available years for each 
country. 
Mrgdp Average annual real GDP growth over available years 
for each country. 
Munemp Average annual unemployment rate over available years 
for each country. 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel A reports the number of year, firm-years and unique firm observations comprising the annual aggregate measures as 
well as the time-series means of aggregate returns and change in aggregate earnings by country. The sample consists of 31 
countries for the period 1988-2016. Panel B reports descriptive statistics of the main variables for the pooled sample. 
Panel C reports descriptive statistics of country-level institutional and macroeconomic variables. All variables are defined 
in Appendix A. 
 
Panel A. Sample coverage and descriptive statistics by country 
 
Country Observations     Mean   
Years Firm-Years Unique Firms Ret ΔX_B ΔX_P 
AUSTRALIA 27 5,586 924 0.114 0.007 0.004
AUSTRIA 27 1,488 149 0.056 0.002 -0.005
BELGIUM 26 1,912 206 0.118 -0.003 -0.013
CANADA 29 4,005 547 0.119 0.005 0.002
CHILE 20 2,095 225 0.123 0.005 0.002
DENMARK 26 2,289 247 0.148 0.016 0.007
FINLAND 23 1,843 181 0.146 0.007 0.007
FRANCE 27 10,752 1,140 0.079 0.001 0.000
GERMANY 25 10,755 1,165 0.092 0.007 0.004
GREECE 20 1,631 233 0.070 0.010 0.014
HONG KONG 24 5,734 916 0.110 0.009 0.006
INDIA 16 21,407 3,520 0.246 0.020 0.009
IRELAND 19 538 77 0.103 0.018 0.008
ISRAEL 19 2,691 456 0.127 0.013 0.006
ITALY 26 3,102 404 0.074 0.001 0.000
JAPAN 29 62,162 4,359 0.035 0.004 0.003
KOREA 17 11,915 1,755 0.113 0.006 0.009
NETHERLANDS 27 2,806 281 0.097 0.002 0.001
NEW ZEALAND 18 948 144 0.088 0.005 0.003
NORWAY 26 2,824 395 0.137 0.013 0.010
PAKISTAN 18 2,697 419 0.272 0.027 0.017
PHILIPPINES 19 1,607 231 0.122 0.011 0.009
PORTUGAL 21 644 78 0.081 0.003 -0.005
SOUTH AFRICA 27 3,337 414 0.151 0.015 0.007
SPAIN 25 2,197 242 0.116 0.006 0.005
SWEDEN 26 5,105 705 0.156 0.013 0.008
SWITZERLAND 27 4,058 372 0.112 0.009 0.004
THAILAND 23 6,642 718 0.092 0.018 0.010
TURKEY 17 2,375 379 0.161 0.008 0.008
UNITED KINGDOM 28 14,178 2,040 0.106 0.007 0.004
UNITED STATES 29 130,262 14,593   0.119 0.008 0.004
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Table 1 Continued 
 
Panel B. Pooled-sample descriptive statistics: Main measures 
  N Mean St. Dev. Q1 Q2 Q3 
ΔX_Bt 731 0.01 0.03 -0.01 0.01 0.03 
ΔX_Pt 731 0.00 0.03 -0.01 0.01 0.02 
Rett 731 0.12 0.28 -0.06 0.12 0.28 
ΔMPt 731 -0.41 2.34 -0.85 -0.15 0.25 
       
 
Panel C. Country-level descriptive statistics: Institutional and macroeconomic measures 
  N Mean St. Dev. Q1 Q2 Q3 
Legal Enforcement 26 8.27 2.03 7.09 9.21 10.00 
Outside Investor Rights 26 3.23 1.31 2.00 3.00 4.00 
Private Control Benefits 26 0.10 0.12 0.02 0.05 0.16 
Political Stability 31 0.45 0.93 0.05 0.89 1.15 
Regulatory Quality 31 1.15 0.68 0.86 1.42 1.67 
Government Effectiveness 31 1.27 0.72 0.61 1.57 1.79 
Control of Corruption 31 1.23 0.97 0.31 1.44 2.04 
Rule of Law 31 1.17 0.77 0.68 1.36 1.77 
WBInst_5 31 1.05 0.79 0.58 1.32 1.66 
WBInst_3 31 1.18 0.80 0.57 1.39 1.80 
Factor1 31 0.30 0.76 -0.26 0.36 0.81 
Discl 31 86.98 16.06 79.35 92.75 100.00 
Cifar 31 72.32 7.84 66.00 74.00 79.00 
Minf 31 3.19 2.92 1.95 2.20 2.85 
Mrgdp 31 3.63 3.85 1.62 2.27 4.05 
Munemp 31 7.52 4.28 4.43 7.02 8.73 
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Table 2. The Aggregate Earnings-Returns Association Across Countries 
 
Panel A reports the results of annual regressions of market returns on contemporaneous changes in aggregate earnings for 
each country. The sample consists of 31 countries for the period 1988-2016. Annual returns are measured over the 
window from April of year t to March of year t+1 using the CRSP value-weighted index. Panel B reports the results of 
annual regressions of market returns on contemporaneous changes in aggregate earnings for the full pooled-sample 
consisting of 731 country-year observations for the period 1988-2016. USA is an indicator variable equal to 1 for the 
United States and 0 for other countries. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
 
Panel A. Country-level regressions  
Country 
β (ΔX_Bt) β (ΔX_Pt) 
Coeff. t-stat R2 Coeff. t-stat R2 
AUSTRALIA 1.143 0.748 0.022 2.374 0.930 0.033 
AUSTRIA 0.773 0.564 0.013 0.608 0.489 0.009 
BELGIUM 4.753*** 3.303 0.312 3.277*** 2.812 0.248 
CANADA 0.837 0.817 0.024 1.453 0.795 0.023 
CHILE 2.175 1.074 0.060 3.616 1.221 0.077 
DENMARK 0.314 0.167 0.001 2.508 0.638 0.017 
FINLAND -0.892 -0.444 0.009 -0.074 -0.030 0.000 
FRANCE 1.898 0.863 0.029 2.427 0.680 0.018 
GERMANY -0.420 -0.160 0.001 -0.831 -0.193 0.002 
GREECE 5.029** 2.837 0.309 2.324 1.566 0.120 
HONG KONG 2.799 0.865 0.033 5.366 0.982 0.042 
INDIA -1.069 -0.240 0.004 1.765 0.195 0.003 
IRELAND 1.369 1.039 0.060 2.904 1.115 0.068 
ISRAEL 3.558*** 3.517 0.421 10.649*** 4.107 0.498 
ITALY 1.480 0.822 0.027 0.502 0.482 0.010 
JAPAN -0.748 -0.282 0.003 -0.850 -0.216 0.002 
KOREA 3.323 0.924 0.054 2.118 0.654 0.028 
NETHERLANDS 4.405*** 3.141 0.283 8.241*** 2.828 0.242 
NEW ZEALAND 0.511 0.404 0.010 1.091 0.469 0.014 
NORWAY 3.822*** 3.077 0.283 5.780*** 3.007 0.274 
PAKISTAN -0.067 -0.035 0.000 0.005 0.003 0.000 
PHILIPPINES 7.776*** 5.303 0.623 12.909*** 6.257 0.697 
PORTUGAL 4.267** 2.225 0.207 2.842 1.620 0.121 
SOUTH AFRICA 0.151 0.135 0.001 1.228 0.502 0.010 
SPAIN 2.801** 2.299 0.187 0.662 0.691 0.020 
SWEDEN 2.439 1.653 0.102 2.542* 1.768 0.115 
SWITZERLAND 1.844 0.822 0.026 4.038 0.841 0.027 
THAILAND 2.449 1.587 0.107 2.968 1.390 0.084 
TURKEY -0.940 -0.498 0.016 2.017 0.497 0.016 
UNITED KINGDOM 2.121 1.186 0.051 2.945 0.930 0.032 
UNITED STATES 3.202** 2.433 0.180 7.413** 2.362 0.171 
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Table 2 Continued 
 
Panel B. Pooled-sample regressions 
Dependent Variable = Ret 
ΔX_Bt  2.104*** 2.080***
(7.177) (7.007)
USA*ΔX_Bt 1.123
(0.560)
USA -0.003 -0.015 
(-0.058) (-0.271) 
ΔX_Pt 1.966*** 1.940*** 
(5.949) (5.852) 
USA*ΔX_Pt 5.473 
(1.150) 
Intercept  0.098*** 0.098*** 0.107*** 0.107*** 
(9.456) (9.258) (10.445) (10.225) 
Obs   731       731       731        731 
Adj R2 0.065 0.063 0.045 0.044 
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Table 3. Intertemporal Variation in the Aggregate Earnings-Returns Association in the U.S.: 1962-2016 
   
Panel A reports the results of annual regressions of market returns on contemporaneous changes in aggregate earnings 
(∆X_B) for the U.S. for five different subperiods: (1) the beginning of the sample period to the last year without 
corresponding global coverage; (2) the sample period used in Kothari et al. (2006); (3) the sample period used in He & Hu 
(2013); (4) the global coverage sample; and (5) the full U.S. data coverage sample. Panel B reports results of rolling 
regressions of the aggregate earnings-returns association (β) on three factors: 1) the aggregate earnings news beta 
(β∆MP_∆X), 2) the market reaction beta (β∆MP), and 3) the predictability of aggregate earnings (Predictability). The first 
annual rolling regression spans 1962 to 1976, with subsequent regressions adding one observation at a time and dropping 
the first observation from the previous window such that the time series remains fixed at 15 yearly observations, yielding 
a total of 41 time-series regressions. For each rolling window, we regress market returns on aggregate earnings changes 
(ΔX_B) to estimate the aggregate earnings-returns relation (β), we regress 1) changes in monetary policy (∆MP) on 
aggregate earnings changes (ΔX_B) to estimate the aggregate earnings news beta (β∆MP_∆X), 2) market returns on 
changes in monetary policy (∆MP) to estimate the market reaction beta (β∆MP), and 3) lagged market returns on 
aggregate earnings changes using the estimating R2 as a proxy for aggregate earnings predictability (Predictability). Panel 
C table reports results from regressing β (Agg E-R), β∆MP_∆X, and β∆MP on macro uncertainty measured using forecasts 
of macro uncertainty from Jurado et al. (2015) (Uncert) or the Anxious Index from the Survey of Professional Forecasters 
(Anx). t-statistics in Panels B and C are calculated using standard errors with the Newey-West adjustment for 
autocorrelation using 3 lags and are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% level, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
 
Panel A. The aggregate earnings-returns regressions by sub-period
Period β (Agg E-R) t-statistic Adj. R2 
 (1) 1962-1987 -6.474** -2.725 0.205
 (2) 1970-2000 -3.706* -1.755 0.065
 (3) 1988-2009 3.450** 2.097 0.139
 (4) 1988-2016 3.202** 2.433 0.150
 (5) 1962-2016 1.528 1.284 0.012
 
Panel B. Rolling regressions: Monetary policy news and aggregate earnings predictability channels 
Dependent Variable = β (Agg E-R) 
  
β∆MP_∆X -0.083*** -0.047*** 
(-8.681) (-4.974) 
β∆MP  95.299*** 49.088*** 
 (11.000) (6.017) 
Predictability  10.343 4.666* 
(0.869) (1.743) 
Constant 5.344*** -1.143*** -2.507 2.032*** 
(6.900) (-3.492) (-1.604) (3.446) 
Obs 41 41 41 41 
Adj R2 0.842 0.883 0.02 0.947 
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Table 3 Continued 
 
Panel C. Rolling regressions: The source of time-series variation – Macroeconomic uncertainty 
                       Dependent Variable 
  β (Agg E-R) β∆MP_∆X β∆MP 
Uncert -82.809*** 9.399*** -63.667*** 
(-4.598) (4.740) (-3.890) 
Constant 75.702*** -7.943*** 58.991*** 
(4.383) (-4.209)  (3.694) 
Obs 41 41 41 
Adj R2 0.432 0.459 0.251 
          
Anx -0.803*** 0.085*** -0.688*** 
(-4.696) (4.474) (-4.941) 
Constant 14.306*** -0.893** 13.272*** 
(4.209) (-2.638) (3.985) 
Obs 34 34 34 
Adj R2 0.569 0.660 0.417 
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Table 4. Intertemporal Variation in the Aggregate Earnings-Returns Association in Canada: 1964-2016 
Panel A reports the results of annual regressions of market returns on contemporaneous changes in aggregate earnings for 
Canada for four sub-periods: (1) the beginning of the sample period to the last year without corresponding global 
coverage; (2) the sample period used in He & Hu (2013); (3) the global coverage sample; (4) the full data coverage 
sample. Panel B reports results of rolling regressions of market returns on contemporaneous changes in aggregate earnings 
for Canada. The first annual rolling regression spans 1964 to 1978, with subsequent regressions adding one observation at 
a time and dropping the first observation from the previous window such that the time series remains fixed at 15 yearly 
observations, yielding a total of 39 time-series regressions. For each rolling window, we regress market returns on 
aggregate earnings changes (ΔX_B) to estimate the aggregate earnings-returns relation (β), we regress changes in 
monetary policy (∆MP) on aggregate earnings changes (ΔX_B) to estimate the aggregate earnings news beta (β∆MP_∆X), 
we regress market returns on changes in monetary policy (∆MP) to estimate the market reaction beta (β∆MP), and we 
regress lagged market returns on aggregate earnings changes using the R2 as a proxy for aggregate earnings predictability 
(Predictability). t-statistics are calculated using standard errors with Newey-West adjustment for autocorrelation using 
three lags and are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
 
Panel A. The aggregate earnings-returns regressions by sub-period
Period Coefficient t-statistic Adj. R2 
 (1) 1964-1987 -2.023* -2.057 0.123
 (2) 1988-2009 0.733 0.536 -0.035
 (3) 1988-2016 0.837 0.817 -0.012
 (4) 1964-2016 -0.354 -0.484 -0.015
 
Panel B. Rolling regressions: Monetary policy news and aggregate earnings predictability channels 
Dependent Variable = β (Agg E-R)
  
β∆MP_∆X -0.187*** -0.096*** 
(-6.523) (-2.755) 
β∆MP 54.040*** 44.094*** 
 (6.394) (4.582) 
Predictability  6.848** -5.203* 
 (2.051) (-1.797) 
Constant 4.868*** 0.239 -0.675 3.088*** 
(5.120) (0.844) (-1.143) (2.810) 
Obs 39       39 39 39 
Adj R2 0.545 0.669 0.090 0.733 
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Table 5. Cross-Country Analysis of the Aggregate Earnings-Returns Association 
 
This table reports results of cross-sectional regressions of country-specific aggregate earnings-returns association (β) on 
country-level estimates of the aggregate earnings news beta (β∆MP_∆X), the market reaction beta (β∆MP), and the 
predictability of aggregate earnings (Predictability). The sample consists of 31 countries over the period 1988-2016. For 
each country, β is estimated by regressing market returns on aggregate earnings changes; β∆MP is estimated by regressing 
market returns on changes in monetary policy; β∆MP_∆X is estimated by regressing monetary policy changes on 
aggregate earnings changes; and Predictability is the R2 estimated from regressing lagged market returns on aggregate 
earnings changes. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% level, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
  Dependent Variable = β (Agg E-R) 
   
β∆MP_∆X -0.037** -0.058***
(-2.414) (-3.737)
β∆MP  7.441 17.633***
 (1.195) (2.968)
Predictability -2.845 -1.370
(-1.351) (-0.769)
Constant 2.498*** 2.494*** 2.515*** 3.880***
(7.557) (5.509) (5.787) (7.491)
Obs 31 31 31 31
Adj R2 0.139 0.014 0.027 0.337
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Table 6. Cross-country Analysis: Institutional Environment 
 
Panel A reports cluster-level mean values of β∆MP_∆X and β∆MP, as well as mean values of an alternative set of betas 
(β∆Rate_∆X and β∆Rate) calculated using 10-year government bond rates for Eurozone countries. The three country 
clusters are as defined in Leuz et al. (2003). Cluster 1 contains Great Britain, Australia, USA, Hong Kong, Canada and 
Norway, cluster 2 contains Japan, France, Switzerland, Germany, Ireland, Sweden, South Africa, Finland, Belgium, 
Denmark, Austria and the Netherlands, and cluster 3 contains Pakistan, Thailand, Philippines, Spain, Portugal, Greece, 
Italy, and Korea. Panel B reports results of cross-sectional regressions of the aggregate earnings news beta (β∆MP_∆X or 
β∆Rate_∆X) and the market reaction beta (β∆MP or β∆Rate) on Legal Enforcement, Outside Investor Rights, and Private 
Control Benefits as well as mean values of inflation, real GDP growth and unemployment for each country. The sample 
consists of 26 countries for the period 1988-2016. Panels C and D report results of cross-sectional regressions of the 
aggregate earnings news beta (β∆MP_∆X or β∆Rate_∆X) and the market reaction beta (β∆MP or β∆Rate) on country-level 
institutional measures from the World Bank. The sample consists 31 countries for the period 1988-2016. t-statistics are 
reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. All 
variables are defined in Appendix A. 
 
Panel A. The aggregate earnings news beta and market reaction beta by cluster 
    Cluster 1 Cluster 2     Cluster 3
n β∆MP_∆X β∆MP  n β∆MP_∆X β∆MP   n β∆MP_∆X β∆MP 
Mean Beta Value 6 23.730 -0.011 12 5.104 -0.075 8 -1.907 -0.059
Mean Alt Beta Value 6 23.730 -0.011 12 3.266 -0.072   8 -11.029 -0.069
 
Panel B. Monetary policy news channel: Investor protection  
β∆MP_∆X β∆MP   β∆Rate_∆X β∆Rate 
   
Legal Enforcement 4.877** -0.002 6.507** -0.001
(2.223) (-0.377) (2.745) (-0.100)
Outside Investor Rights 5.912** 0.020** 6.961** -0.007
(2.100) (2.440) (2.288) (-0.808)
Private Control Benefits 21.284 -0.084 25.998 -0.169
(0.651) (-0.881) (0.736) (-1.653)
Minf 6.396* -0.006 5.064 0.001
(2.026) (-0.649) (1.484) (0.076)
Mrgdp -0.225 0.009 0.703 0.001
 (-0.097) (1.367) (0.282) (0.162)
Munemp -0.905 -0.001 0.162 -0.004
 (-0.797) (-0.401) (0.132) (-1.223)
Constant -61.360** -0.091 -86.569*** 0.082
(-2.314) (-1.176) (-3.020) (0.989)
 
Obs         26        26       26        26 
Adj R2 0.501 0.323 0.491 0.070
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Table 6 Continued 
 
Panel C. Monetary policy news channel: World Bank institutional environment measures 
Institutional 
Var Political Stability  
Regulatory 
Quality
Government 
Effectiveness
Control of 
Corruption  Rule of Law WBInst_5 WBInst_3 
β∆MP_
∆X β∆MP  
β∆MP_ 
∆X β∆MP  
β∆MP_ 
∆X β∆MP  
β∆MP_ 
∆X β∆MP  
β∆MP_ 
∆X β∆MP  
β∆MP_ 
∆X β∆MP  
β∆MP_
∆X β∆MP 
Institutional 
Var 
 
10.207** -0.003  18.806*** 0.014  14.614*** -0.001  10.611*** 0.001  15.539*** -0.004  14.719*** 0.001  14.819*** 0.003 
  (2.437) (-0.248)  (3.89) (0.827)  (2.829) (-0.044)  (2.912) (0.100)  (3.255) (-0.252)  (3.193) (0.057)  (3.363) (0.200) 
Minf  4.548** -0.010  6.402*** -0.007  5.676** -0.009  5.020** -0.009  5.742** -0.010  5.613** -0.009  5.712** -0.009 
  (2.088) (-1.426)  (3.146) (-0.916)  (2.539) (-1.290)  (2.366) (-1.295)  (2.704) (-1.396)  (2.644) (-1.274)  (2.732) (-1.217) 
Mrgdp  0.759 0.009*  -0.336 0.008  0.062 0.009*  0.387 0.009*  0.186 0.009*  0.275 0.009*  0.132 0.009* 
  (0.500) (1.764)  (-0.250) (1.681)  (0.042) (1.791)  (0.266) (1.793)  (0.132) (1.805)  (0.194) (1.791)  (0.094) (1.780) 
Munemp  -0.264 0.002  -0.497 0.002  -0.36 0.002  -0.220 0.002  -0.126 0.002  -0.272 0.002  -0.257 0.002 
  (-0.333) (0.929)  (-0.712) (0.906)  (-0.469) (0.940)  (-0.289) (0.944)  (-0.170) (0.913)  (-0.366) (0.941)  (-0.351) (0.947) 
Constant  -9.069 -0.069**  -26.117** -0.095***  -23.234** -0.072*  -17.884* -0.075**  -25.311** -0.066*  -21.470** -0.075**  -23.365** -0.078** 
  (-1.101) (-2.642)  (-2.759) (-2.816)  (-2.066) (-1.943)  (-1.870) (-2.385)  (-2.377) (-1.812)  (-2.181) (-2.236)  (-2.355) (-2.300) 
                      
Obs  31   31  31 31   31     31 31 31     31    31    31 31     31 31 
Adj R2 0.297 -0.020  0.454 0.003  0.340 -0.023  0.349 -0.022  0.387 -0.020  0.380    -0.023  0.399 -0.021 
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Table 6 Continued 
 
Panel D. Monetary policy news channel with alternative Eurozone interest rates: World Bank institutional environment measures  
Institutional Var Political Stability Regulatory Quality Government Effectiveness
Control of 
Corruption Rule of Law WBInst_5           WBInst_3 
  β∆Rate 
_∆X 
β∆Rate  β∆Rate 
_∆X 
β∆Rate  β∆Rate
_∆X 
β∆Rate  β∆Rate_
∆X 
β∆Rate  β∆Rate
_∆X 
β∆Rate  β∆Rate
_∆X 
β∆Rate  β∆Rate
_∆X 
β∆Rate 
                      
Institutional 
Var  11.021** 0.003 22.428*** 0.021 19.663*** 0.003 14.199*** 0.008  18.555*** 0.003 18.139*** 0.008 18.494*** 0.010 
  (2.270) (0.184) (4.156) (1.117) (3.537) (0.180) (3.626) (0.587)  (3.457) (0.164) (3.549) (0.456) (3.825) (0.615) 
Minf  5.035* -0.011 7.437*** -0.007 7.000*** -0.010 6.102** -0.009  6.653*** -0.010 6.605*** -0.010 6.771*** -0.009 
  (1.993) (-1.381) (3.273) (-0.890) (2.910) (-1.279) (2.676) (-1.226)  (2.787) (-1.311) (2.805) (-1.207) (2.951) (-1.147) 
Mrgdp  1.061 0.010* -0.205 0.010* 0.217 0.010* 0.654 0.010*  0.418 0.010* 0.519 0.010* 0.338 0.010* 
  (0.602) (1.962) (-0.137) (1.819) (0.137) (1.932) (0.418) (1.962)  (0.263) (1.943) (0.329) (1.946) (0.220) (1.927) 
Munemp  -1.086 0.002 -1.354* 0.001 -1.192 0.001 -1.005 0.002  -0.912 0.002 -1.083 0.002 -1.063 0.002 
  (-1.182) (0.549) (-1.737) (0.492) (-1.445) (0.540) (-1.226) (0.578)  (-1.092) (0.554) (-1.313) (0.558) (-1.322) (0.567) 
Constant  -8.981 -0.072** -30.664*** -0.102** -31.224** -0.075* -23.872** -0.084**  -29.747** -0.075* -26.093** -0.082** -28.839** -0.087** 
  (-0.940) (-2.508) (-2.901) (-2.762) (-2.580) (-1.851) (-2.322) (-2.439)  (-2.485) (-1.867) (-2.390) (-2.246) (-2.649) (-2.340) 
                      
Obs  31 31  31 31  31 31  31 31  31 31  31 31         31 31 
Adj R2 0.308 0.003  0.502 0.047  0.440 0.003  0.449 0.015  0.432 0.003  0.441 0.009  0.469 0.016 
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Table 7. Cross-country Analysis: Financial Transparency Measures 
This table reports results of cross-country regressions of the aggregate earnings news beta (β∆MP_∆X), the market reaction beta (β∆MP), and the 
predictability of aggregate earnings (Predictability) on measures of financial transparency. Factor1 is a summary measure of financial 
transparency from Bushman et al. (2004). Discl is a measure of disclosure intensity regarding some proprietary information including R&D, 
capital expenditure, and segment data from Bushman et al. (2004). Cifar is a measure of comprehensiveness of financial information disclosure, 
developed by the Center for Financial Analysis and Research. The sample consists 31 countries for the period 1988-2016. t-statistics are reported 
in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. All other variables are defined in 
Appendix A. 
 
 β∆MP_∆X  β∆MP  Predictability
        
Factor1 10.755**  0.015 0.067
(2.344)  (1.093) (1.569)
Discl  0.464** -0.000 0.003
 (2.226) (-0.085) (1.398)
Cifar   0.591 0.001 0.001
  (1.380) (0.880) (0.172)
Minf 4.572** 4.373* 3.410 -0.007 -0.010 -0.008 0.006 0.004 -0.004
(2.074) (1.983) (1.519) (-1.008) (-1.376) (-1.262) (0.289) (0.200) (-0.199)
Mrgdp 0.301 0.200 0.482 0.008* 0.009* 0.009* -0.001 -0.002 -0.001
(0.197) (0.130) (0.298) (1.800) (1.795) (1.848) (-0.095) (-0.132) (-0.040)
Munemp -0.447 -0.686 -0.470 0.002 0.002 0.002 -0.002 -0.004 -0.002
(-0.560) (-0.839) (-0.552) (0.903) (0.939) (0.859) (-0.316) (-0.487) (-0.241)
Constant -4.633 -38.980* -40.918 -0.084*** -0.068 -0.155 0.131* -0.067 0.128
(-0.626) (-1.951) (-1.257) (-3.673) (-1.087) (-1.625) (1.902) (-0.360) (0.429)
    
Obs 31 31 31  31 31 31  31 31 31
Adj R2 0.287 0.275 0.196  0.022 -0.023 0.007  -0.036 -0.055 -0.133
 
 
